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PROVING THE NEGATIVE:
FLORIDA'S STAND YOUR GROUND LAW AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Connor Bishop*
Abstract
Self-defense and Stand Your Ground laws are controversial subjects in today’s world. On
one side, some argue that these laws protect our Second Amendment right to bear arms, protect
ourselves, and our loved ones without fear of criminal prosecution. On the other hand, opponents
argue that Stand Your Ground laws encourage evermore violent acts and vigilantism. In the center
is the controversy of applying the law. From the people who are disproportionately charged and
tried to those that avoid prosecution, this country has become a heightened example of the
problems with the current state of self-defense. From Zimmerman to the McMichaels, Stand Your
Ground cases remain a polarizing issue in this country.
Stand Your Ground laws are instrumental in protecting the justified killer against
prosecution, but a 2017 change to the immunity procedure presents a novel dilemma for
prosecutors. As Stand Your Ground laws have become the majority view in this country,
opponents have proposed alternatives, and activist groups have advocated for the abolition of selfdefense immunity in the wake of an increase in gun violence. This article proposes a different
solution, one that avoids the necessity of two full trials, better protects the innocent defendant, and
brings self-defense claims in line with other defenses in criminal law.

*

J.D., magna cum laude, 2022, Dwayne O. Andreas Barry School of Law. Mr. Bishop was the Managing Editor for
the Barry Law Review from 2021-2022. I would like to give special thanks to my wife, Courtney Bishop, for
encouraging me to pursue my dreams. I want to thank my son, Grayson Bishop, for bringing constant joy and
motivation to be the best role model possible. Thank you to my father, Conrad “Sonny” Cecil Bishop III, and my
grandfather, Conrad “CC” Cecil Bishop Jr., for your endless support. Thank you to Professor Sonya Garza, for
countless hours of discussion, review, and advice. I would not be where I am without you all. This article is dedicated
in memory of my mother, Kathleen McCarthy Bishop, who spent her life standing up for what is right.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2022

1

Barry Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

INTRODUCTION
When someone is killed, who should have the duty of proving what happened, the killer or
someone else? When threatened with great bodily harm, a person's right to self-defense has long
been recognized under Florida law.1
The common law recognizes one’s right to use deadly force to defend oneself or another
when it is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.2 Under the
common law, a person also has a duty to retreat where reasonably possible before one could use
force to defend oneself or property.3 Even the Bible provides guidance on instances where deadly
force would be a justified use of self-defense.4 The Florida Supreme Court recognized the common
law duty to retreat, requiring a person to “retreat to the wall” or use every reasonable means within
his or her power to avoid the danger, except a person claiming self-defense in his or her residence,
which is known as the Castle Doctrine.5 The Castle Doctrine, recognizing the heightened sense of
privacy inside one’s home, removes the duty to retreat before using force in instances where one
is attacked inside their own home.6 As a matter of public policy, we want people to defend
themselves. But to what extent? How far should we, as a society, extend the common law
protections of self-defense? A recent Florida Supreme Court decision presents an interesting
scenario.
Mr. Ronald Bretherick (“Ronald”) is driving with his family to Downtown Disney in
Orlando, Florida, when he notices “a blue truck rapidly approaching them.”7 Mr. Dunning
(“Dunning”) is driving the blue truck, and he almost sideswipes the Brethericks as he passes in the
right lane.8 Dunning “stare[s] at them in a threatening manner” but makes no statements or gestures
as he passes Ronald.9 Dunning pulls in front of Ronald and comes to a complete stop without any
traffic or other obstacle blocking his path.10 Dunning gets out of his truck and approaches the
Bretherick car.11 In response, Ronald “h[olds] up a holstered handgun, and Dunning return[s] to
his truck without another word.”12 Then Ronald’s son, Jared Bretherick (“Bretherick”), gets out of
the car and approaches Dunning’s truck.13 At this point, Bretherick points the handgun at Dunning
and tells him to drive away or else he would shoot.14 After a few tense moments, Bretherick returns
to his vehicle and continues to hold Dunning at gunpoint from his truck until police arrive to diffuse

1

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful
authority of the state shall not be infringed.”).
2
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999) (“Under [the] . . . common law, a person may use deadly force
in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm.”).
3
Id. (explaining that one has a duty to retreat to the wall).
4
Exodus 22:1–2 (explaining that when a homeowner kills a thief breaking and entering at night there is no blood guilt,
but there is bloodguilt if done during the day).
5
Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049, 1056.
6
Id. at 1049.
7
Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 769 (Fla. 2015).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 770.
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the situation.15 In this case, Dunning did not have a gun or other weapon and no one was killed,
but what if someone had died?
Under current Florida law, the outcome-determinative question is not whether the
defendant used or threatened to use deadly force but rather if the State can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant did not act in self-defense.16 The defendant has no duty to
explain themselves,17 and in fact, cannot be arrested, charged, or otherwise prosecuted unless the
State can convince a judge that the defendant did not act in self-defense.18
Is this legislative decision to shift the burden of proof from the defendant to the State, as a
matter of public policy, a positive change in society that accurately reflects the morality of the
people? By expanding the common law Castle Doctrine to protect the justified use of deadly force
from any criminal prosecution, this article argues that the legislature has exceeded the intent of
protecting those that are justified in using deadly force, eliminated the original reasoning behind
the doctrine, and created an illogical problem of proving the negative by requiring the State to
prove that a person did not act in self-defense. However, this problem can be corrected by placing
the burden back on the person who brings the defense while still honoring the protections given to
people who use justifiable force.
Part I of this paper will address the legislative history and the process for raising a Stand
Your Ground defense. Section A explains the process where one asserts immunity, and Section B
discusses the expansion of the Stand Your Ground law in response to the 2014 George Zimmerman
Trial. Part II will discuss the opposing views in the Florida Supreme Court from the Bretherick v.
State decision; Section A will discuss the majority opinion’s reasoning, while Section B will
address Justice Canady’s views in the dissent. Part III will analyze the 2017 amendment to the
Stand Your Ground law and the new dilemma that prosecutors face. Section A will review the
intent behind the 2017 amendment, and Section B will discuss the changes to the immunity process
under the current Stand Your Ground law. Finally, Section C will present a case study on the
prosecution dilemma that this amendment has created.
Part IV addresses the constitutional issues with the current law in Section A, and Section
B will take a brief glimpse into the numbers behind gun violence and the racial and social impact
that Stand Your Ground statutes have had in our country. Part V will review alternatives to our
current procedure; Section A will discuss the immunity procedure used in Georgia, and Section B
discusses the arguments for the abolition of Stand Your Ground immunity. Finally, Part VI
discusses the procedure used in motions to suppress in Section A, and Section B discusses this
article’s proposal to adopt a similar procedure that reflects the spirit of the law while still providing
immunity to qualified individuals.
I.

A LEGISLATIVE PROGRESSION TOWARDS PROTECTING THE DEFENDANT

In 2005, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 436, which contained the Stand Your
Ground provisions, removing the duty to retreat before using deadly force in situations where one
had a right to be.19 The Stand Your Ground legislation actually amended two prior statutes and
15

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2017).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3, cl. 1 (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”).
18
§ 776.032.
19
2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2005–27, sec. 1, § 776.013(3) (West).
16
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created two new statutes.20 Section 776.031, the “defense of property statute,” was amended
removing the duty to retreat in “a place where he or she has a right to be.”21 In addition, § 776.012,
the “self-defense statute,” was amended to remove the duty to retreat “where one had a right to
be” under the new law, § 776.013 or the “home protection statute.”22 The new home protection
statute codified the common law Castle Doctrine stating that:
A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that
is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the person against whom
the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully
entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied
vehicle . . . or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.23
The home-protection statute extended the Castle Doctrine by expanding the protection to any
dwelling, residence, or vehicle where one had a “right to be” and created a presumption of
reasonable fear to use deadly force in preventing the unlawful entry into the area or the removal
of another person from the area against that person’s will.24 The legislature gave broad definitions
to “dwelling,” “residence,” and “vehicle,” extending the protection to temporary buildings, tents,
and cargo containers.25
Finally, § 776.032, the “immunity statute,” was created to prevent “arresting, detaining in
custody, and charging or prosecuting” a person who lawfully acted under the self-defense, home
protection, or defense of property statutes.26 The immunity statute protects those who use justified
force by prohibiting both the State and private parties from forcing him or her to face trial because
of their actions.27 Law enforcement could use “standard procedures for investigating the use of
force . . . but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is
probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.”28 This use of immunity is distinct from
the common definition of immunity.29 There are four general types of immunity at law:
a) a promise not to prosecute for a crime in exchange for information or testimony
in a criminal matter, granted by the prosecutors, a judge, a grand jury or an
investigating legislative committee; b) public officials' protection from liability for
their decisions (like a city manager or member of a public hospital board); c)
governmental (or sovereign) immunity, which protects government agencies from

20

See generally 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2005–27 (West).
Id. at sec. 3, § 776.031.
22
Id. at sec. 2, § 776.012.
23
Id. at sec. 1, § 776.013; see FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (1995) (“‘Forcible Felony’ means treason; murder; . . . and any
other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.”).
24
2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2005–27, sec. 1, § 776.013 (West).
25
Id.
26
Id. at sec. 4, § 776.032(1).
27
Id. (preventing the State and private parties from asserting criminal or civil actions against the person claiming
immunity).
28
Id. at sec. 4, § 776.032(2).
29
Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21
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lawsuits unless the government agreed to be sued; d) diplomatic immunity which
excuses foreign ambassadors from most U.S. criminal laws.30
These statutes discussed supra, in addition to § 776.041(2),31 the “initial aggressor statute,”
provide the possible claims for self-defense to criminal prosecution.32 Under the initial aggressor
statute, an aggressor who “[i]nitially provokes the use of force” generally may not invoke the Stand
Your Ground defense.33 The initial aggressor statute provides an exception for a good faith
withdrawal by 1) stopping the use of force, 2) withdrawing from physical contact, 3) indicating to
the other person that he or she desires to withdraw and end the conflict, and 4) the other person
continues to pursue or resume the use of force.34 The initial aggressor statute also provided an
exception for situations where one had made every attempt to retreat and reasonably believed that
the use of force was necessary to prevent great bodily harm or death to himself or herself or
another.35
To justify deadly force, “the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably
cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger
could be avoided only through the use of . . . [deadly force].”36 A person must actually
(subjectively) believe that the danger was real, and that belief must be one that the fact-finder
views as objectively necessary.37 The statutes discussed supra cover all conflicts between two
people, as long as one of those people is not a member of law enforcement acting in their official
capacity,38 and provide the available defenses that one would raise under self-defense in a criminal
proceeding.39
A. How Does a Defendant Assert Immunity?
Under the 2005 Stand Your Ground laws, a defendant who acted in self-defense would file
a Motion to Dismiss at or before the arraignment hearing.40 The defendant would be moving to
dismiss the count on the grounds that “[t]here are no material disputed facts and the undisputed
facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.”41 The trial court would
then hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the matter.42 The trial court is required to
30

Immunity, LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=897 [https://perma.cc/9DKTJGLP] (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
31
See FLA. STAT. § 776.041(2) (2014).
32
This article will briefly discuss the social epidemic involving people of color, minors and the gun violence epidemic
in Part IV, but will not address the legal analysis of juvenile proceedings.
33
§ 776.041(2).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See In re: Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases–Report 2019-01, 285 So. 3d 1248, 1254 (Fla. 2019).
37
Id.
38
See FLA. STAT. § 776.05 (2014) (explaining that law enforcement is justified in the use of any force to defend
himself or another, arrest, or retake escaped felons); see also State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 732 (Fla. 2018) (holding
that law enforcement officers are eligible to assert immunity under s. 776.032 or s. 776.05).
39
See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (“A person who uses or threaten to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776013, or s.
776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution . . . .”).
40
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b) (“All defenses available to a defendant by plea, other than not guilty, shall be made
only by motion to dismiss the indictment or information, whether the same shall relate to matters of form, substance,
former acquittal, former jeopardy, or any other defense.”).
41
Id. R. (c)(4).
42
Govoni v. State, 67 So. 3d 1048, 1048 (Fla. 2011).
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decide the matter by confronting and weighing not only the legal issue but must decide disputed
issues of material fact in determining whether the defendant acted reasonably to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.43
B. Expanding the Zone of Protection: The 2014 Amendment
In July of 2013, following the highly publicized George Zimmerman trial, the Florida
Legislature began reviewing and then amended the Stand Your Ground Laws in 2014.44 The 2014
amendment, House Bill 89, had two purposes: provide criminal and civil immunity under
circumstances that would have been immune had force actually been used, and clarify that those
who threaten to use deadly force would also be immune from criminal and civil proceedings.45
This change added “or threatening to use” force to protect those who threatened to use deadly force
under the immunity statute.46
Further, the legislature changed the home-protection statute by expanding the statute to all
circumstances where a person is not engaged in criminal activity and is in any home, residence, or
vehicle where he or she has a right to be.47 These changes addressed the substantive law, but the
procedural question of who should bear the burden of proof at the defendant’s pretrial hearing for
determining immunity was not decided.48
II.

TWO APPROACHES TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF: BRETHERICK V. STATE

When a person is put in a situation where they subjectively believe that their life is in
danger and thus uses deadly force, should that person’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent be
waived to raise self-defense under the Stand Your Ground law? Does the defense attorney have to
lay out their entire case at the pretrial hearing, exposing their plan of attack to the prosecution?
The Florida Supreme Court answered this question and provided two opposing rationales on
whether the burden of proof should rest with the State or the defendant at the pretrial immunity
hearing.49
A. The Majority View: The Party Who Brings The Action Also Brings The Burden
Statutory interpretation must begin by determining legislative intent.50 The first step in
determining legislative intent is to look at the actual statutory language because “the statute’s text
is the most reliable and authoritative expression” of the legislature’s intent.51 Because the
legislature enacts statutes with an intent to make a change in the law, courts must avoid interpreting
43

See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
See generally 2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2014-195 (West); Karl Etters, Protesters Press for Changes in Stand Your
Ground Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/10/stand-yourground-protesters/6257543/ [https://perma.cc/7AQ5-E932].
45
2014 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2014-195 at sec. 6, § 776.032(1) (West).
46
Id.
47
Id. at sec. 4, § 776.013(3).
48
See Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 768 (Fla. 2015) (deciding whether the defendant or State should bear the
burden of proof at the pretrial hearing).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 772 (explaining that legislative intent guides statutory analysis).
51
Id.
44
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the law in a manner that would make sections of that law meaningless.52 The court held that “the
plain language of [the immunity statute] grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity
from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.”53 Accordingly, the grant of immunity
must provide for greater protection than a probable cause determination previously provided
before the Stand Your Ground laws were enacted.54 Therefore, “the trial court must decide the
matter by confronting and weighing only factual disputes” and “may not deny a motion simply
because factual disputes exist.”55 Like the procedure for handling a question of statutory immunity,
the statute did not address which party is to have the burden of proof.56
In applying the immunity statute, the trial “courts have imposed a similar burden for
motions challenging the voluntariness of a confession.”57 The majority agreed and held that “the
defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate
entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing.”58 The court
recognized several rationales in determining that the defendant should bear the burden: 1) the
statute does not provide blanket immunity from prosecution, 2) no court has required the State to
disprove a defense beyond a reasonable doubt at a pretrial hearing, 3) to require the State to
disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt would result in two trials, 4) placing the burden
on the defendant is consistent with other types of motions to dismiss, and 5) regular citizens are
not held to the same standard as law enforcement when determining immunity, each of which is
discussed below.59
First, the Florida Supreme Court feared that requiring the State to disprove immunity in
every pretrial hearing would create a presumption of blanket immunity when using deadly force.60
Because the legislature did not create a procedure for testing a defendant’s immunity claim, courts
must provide a solution that does not force the defendant into defending his rights through a full
trial. Therefore, a pretrial hearing allows a defendant to test their immunity claim while still
preserving the right to assert self-defense at trial.61 This allows a defendant who justifiably used
deadly force to establish that they acted lawfully and are thus entitled to the immunity to avoid
criminal prosecution and civil liability.62
Second, the majority argued that no court in this country has required the prosecution to
have the burden of proof at a pretrial hearing, and the highest courts in three states—Colorado,
Georgia, and South Carolina—agree with a procedure where the defendant must prove that he or
she is entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.63 Other states with Stand Your
Ground laws—Kentucky and Kansas—held that “the prosecution had to establish only that there
was probable cause that the defendant’s use of force was not legally justified.”64
52

Id. at 773.
Id. at 772; see Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (“[T]he existence of disputed issues of material fact
did not warrant denial of a motion to dismiss [under the] immunity [statute].”).
54
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 773.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 775; see FLA STAT. § 776.032 (2014).
57
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 774.
58
Id. at 768; see People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 980 (Colo. 1987) (requiring the defendant to prove that immunity
applies by a preponderance of the burden).
59
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 775–78.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 775.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
53
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Third, the majority found that placing the burden on the defendant was consistent with how
other types of motions to dismiss are handed under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b).65
This result “is consistent with jurisprudence that requires the defendant, who is seeking the
immunity, to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”66 The case precedent
also suggests that the immunity hearing should proceed accordingly.67 The words “[d]efenses” and
“defense” as used in the statutes are given a broad definition that allows for all possible defenses
a defendant could make.68 The phrase “may at any time be entertained by the court” clarifies that
the four explicitly stated grounds listed in rule 3.190(c) may be brought at any time, but is not an
exhaustive list.69 In addition, the rule provides that “the court may receive evidence on any issue
of fact necessary to the decision on the motion,” expressly allowing for situations where a judge
must resolve disputed issues of fact in addition to the legal question.70 This allows a defendant to
prove that they were justified in their actions without the need for a full criminal trial because a
judge must decide factual issues at the pretrial hearing.71 As a practical matter, the majority argued
that defendants in similar transactional immunity hearings also bear the burden of proving
immunity in a similar pretrial hearing.72 Further, courts also use a similar process in deciding a
motion to suppress evidence under an unlawful search allegation.73
“Fourth, to place the burden on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was not entitled to immunity would require the State to establish the same degree of
proof twice—once pretrial and again at trial.”74 The result would be that the State would have to
prosecute “two full-blown trials: one before the trial judge and then another before the jury.”75 The
pretrial evidentiary hearing should not be treated the same as a full trial because the question is not
whether the defendant committed the crime but whether they were justified in using self-defense.76
In fact, the majority and the Colorado Supreme Court pointed out that, compared to the State, the
defendant would be in a better position to explain what happened at the pretrial hearing when all
of the facts have not been established and is incentivized to establish immunity.77 The result of the
two proceedings is not consistent: If the defendant loses at the pretrial hearing, he or she is free to
raise the same defenses at trial before a jury.78 The majority feared that, by forcing the State to
bear the burden at the pretrial hearing, the defendant would be found immune in situations where
the State did not possess all the evidence to refute the self-defense allegations.79
Finally, forcing the State to prove its case twice would not only encourage potentially
meritless arguments but would cause undue expense and delay for the justice system.80 In
comparison, the defendant’s right to a fair trial is not diminished, “as the State still has to prove its
65

Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 776.
Id.
67
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 776
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 777.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.; People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 981 (Colo. 1987).
79
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 777.
80
Id. at 777–78.
66
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case and all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.”81 The result would
create “a process fraught with [the] potential for abuse.”82
B. Legislature’s Intent is to Protect All Justified Uses of Force From Prosecution
Justice Canady dissented with the majority because the essential nature of the factual
question raised by the defendant is the same at the pretrial hearing and at trial: “whether the
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not justified
under the governing statutory standard.”83 When a defendant raises self-defense at trial, he or she
can only be convicted “if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not
apply.”84 By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, “the majority’s decision here guarantees
that certain defendants who would be entitled to acquittal at trial will nonetheless be deprived of
immunity from trial.”85
Because Justice Canady believed that any fear of potential fraud or injustice should be
addressed by the legislature, he reasoned that the fact that “it is easier for a defendant to prove
entitlement to immunity” has no application at trial, and therefore should not have any basis at the
pretrial evidentiary hearing.86 In addition, the potential result of “‘two full-blown trials’—by no
means a specious concern—cannot justify curtailing the immunity from trial . . . for those
individuals whose use of force or threat of force is legally justified under the governing statutory
standard.”87 The legislature’s intent was to protect all people who use justifiable force from
criminal or civil prosecution.88 Further, practical problems raised by the Stand Your Ground law—
such as undue expenses and clogging the legal system—should be considered and resolved by the
legislature.89
III.

THE 2017 AMENDMENT TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF: JUSTICE CANADY’S VIEW
IV.
In 2017, the Florida Legislature made another change to the Stand Your Ground Law to
clarify the legislative intent when determining who holds the burden of proof at the pre-trial
evidentiary hearing. Section 776.032(4) was added to provide clarity on the legislature’s intent on
who should bear the burden at a pretrial immunity hearing:
In a criminal prosecution, once a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from
criminal prosecution has been raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity
hearing, the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence is on the party

81

Id. at 778.
Id. at 777.
83
Id. at 779 (Canady, J., dissenting).
84
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 779 (Canady, J., dissenting) (citing Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2013); Leasure v. State, 105 So.3d 5, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424, 427 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).
85
Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 780 (Canady, J., dissenting).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
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seeking to overcome the immunity from criminal prosecution provided in
subsection (1).90
Effective July 1, 2017, the amended law shifted the burden of proof from requiring the defendant
to prove that (1) he or she subjectively acted in self-defense to protect oneself or another’s life and
(2) their actions were objectively reasonable by the preponderance of the evidence, to require the
state to prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense by clear-and-convincing evidence.91
The legislature also amended the home defense statute.92 The statute stated that a person has “no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground” in a dwelling or residence where they
have a right to be.93 Nondeadly force is allowed “to the extent that the person reasonably believes”
is necessary to defend themselves or another against an “imminent use of unlawful force.”94
Deadly force is permissible if there is a reasonable belief that the force is necessary to “prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm” their person, another person, or “to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony.”95 This change clarified the situations when a presumption of
reasonable fear occurs, rather than relying on the self-defense and defense of property statutes.96
In its current state, the home defense statute creates the presumption that one is acting in
justified self-defense against imminent unlawful force, or to prevent great bodily injury or
death.97 This presumption generally applies unless the other party has a right to be in the home98
or is a lawful resident;99 the person that is attempted to be removed is the child, grandchild or is
in the lawful custody or under lawful guardianship; 100 the person asserting self-defense is
engaged in criminal activity or is otherwise using the home to further criminal activity;101 or the
other person is a law enforcement officer acting in their official duty and identified themselves,
or the person reasonably should have known that the party was a law enforcement officer.102
A. The Legislative Intent for Amending the Law
In 2017, the legislature passed these changes following Justice Canady’s dissent in the
2015 Bretherick v. State decision.103 The reasoning behind the shift is based on Justice Canady’s
argument that one who justifiably uses deadly force to defend oneself or another is completely
immune from criminal prosecution, and thus the state must prove at a pre-trial hearing that the

90

2017 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2017-72, at sec. 1, § 776.032(4) (West).
Id.
92
See generally 2017 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2017-77 (West).
93
Id. at sec. 1, § 776.013(1).
94
Id. § (1)(a).
95
Id. § (1)(b).
96
Id. § (3).
97
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2).
98
Examples include owners, leasees, or titleholders. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3)(a).
99
The lawful resident does not apply if there is “an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written
pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person.” Id. § (3)(a).
100
Id. § (3)(b).
101
Id. § (3)(c).
102
Id. § (3)(d).
103
THE PRO. STAFF OF THE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS & FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CS/SB 128, 1st
Sess., at 1 (Fla. 2017).
91
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defendant did not act in self-defense.104 The legislature adopted Justice Canady’s view because
they did not want to have one who would be later acquitted at trial to be denied immunity.105
The legislature amended the home defense statute to clarify when a person would have the
right to use force.106 By removing the language that “[a] person who is attacked” and replacing it
with a reasonable standard for preventing death or great bodily harm, the legislature created
broader protection for those who use or threaten to use deadly force because an individual does
not have to be attacked, but only reasonably fear an attack.107 The legislature also created
ambiguous terms by not defining “imminent” or “raise a prima facie claim.”108 Legislative intent
is determined by applying the languages’ plain and ordinary meaning.109 When the legislature’s
terms are not expressly defined, it is “appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions” to decide the
plain and ordinary meaning.110 “Imminent danger” means immediate danger that cannot be stopped
by calling for aid or law enforcement.111 To put it another way, there must be an immediate
necessity to use force or no possible attempt of retreat or other conduct but to defend oneself.112 A
“claim” is defined as “a statement that [is] something yet to be proved” or “the assertion of an
existing right.”113 “Prima facie” is defined as statements that are “sufficient to establish a fact or
raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted.”114 Further, the defendant need not present
evidence at the pretrial hearing but may rely on the four corners of the motion to dismiss.115
B. The Pretrial Procedure Under the 2017 Amendment
Under the new law, a defendant is entitled to an immunity hearing in which the State bears
the burden of proof by filing a motion that clearly states the reasons the defendant is immune and
alleges the facts on which the immunity claim is based.116 A defendant must make a prima facie
case at the pretrial hearing,117 showing that “he (1) was attacked in a place where he had a right to
be, (2) was not engaged in any unlawful activity, and (3) reasonably believed it was necessary to
use force to prevent death or great bodily harm.”118 A prima facie case must raise a presumption
in favor of the defendant’s argument if all assertions are taken as fact and is generally considered
to be a low standard of proof, below even the preponderance of the evidence threshold.119 If the
court does not grant the motion for immunity, the motion and its contents are admissible at trial,120
104

Id.
Id.
106
2017 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2017-77 at sec 1, § 776.013(1) (West).
107
Id.
108
§§ 776.013, .032 (2017).
109
Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 772 (Fla. 2015).
110
Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
111
Imminent Danger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
112
See USE OF FORCE IN SELF-PROT., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. L. INST. 2002).
113
Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
114
Prima Facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
115
See Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1026 (providing that a defendant must raise the claim instead of proving it with
testimony or physical evidence).
116
FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2017).
117
FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014).
118
Williams v. State, 261 So. 3d 1248, 1252 (Fla. 2019).
119
Compare Prima Facie, supra note 114, with Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
120
Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822, 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
105
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but a defendant is not required to testify at the pretrial hearing to raise a prima facie defense.121
These changes create a unique problem for prosecutors. The purpose of these changes was to
overrule the majority opinion in Bretherick.122
Under the new procedure, a defendant meets their prima facie showing in the motion to
dismiss without the necessity to present any evidence at the pretrial hearing.123 Then, the
prosecutor, while gathering evidence and testimony to meet their burden faster than they would
under another defense, must disprove the motion without cross-examining the defendant.124 The
prosecutor must make these determinations quickly or show good cause to request a continuance
that may only be granted at the trial court’s discretion.125 Finally, the State must convince the judge
that the defendant’s version of events is implausible, and their version of events is highly and
substantially more probable to leave the judge with a firm conviction that the defendant was not
justified in using deadly force.126
This procedure creates the same burden on the prosecution that they face at trial: once the
defendant establishes a prima facie case of self-defense, the State must overcome that defense,
either by rebuttal or by inference.127 The State must prove the negative twice: once at the
evidentiary hearing by clear and convincing evidence and again at trial, beyond a reasonable
doubt.128 How can requiring two trials be in the best interests of the people, the victim, the
defendant, and judicial efficiency?
C. A Prosecutor’s Dilemma in Deciding to Pursue a Case
To highlight the prosecutor’s dilemma in deciding whether to pursue a case for murder,
consider the following hypothetical. The police receive a 911 call stating that a man was seen
breaking and entering a house under construction.129 The police receive a second 911 call from a
man that claims he was attacked and, fearing for his life, shot and killed the suspect who was
attempting to take his gun from him.130 The man says that there had been several break-ins recently

121

Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1028.
THE PRO. STAFF OF THE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CS/SB 128, 1st
Sess., at 1 (Fla. 2017).
123
§ 776.032(4); see also Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020); Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1022.
124
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3, cl. 1.
125
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(f)(2).
126
See, e.g., Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Merritt v. OLMHP, LLC, 112 So.
3d 559, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”);
Cummings v. State, 310 So. 3d 155, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
127
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 765 So. 2d 950, 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
128
Quaggin v. State, 752 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that there must be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant’s use of deadly force was unreasonable).
129
This is a hypothetical scenario based on the Ahmaud Arbery shooting. Compare Public Release Incident Report
for G20-11303, GLYNN CTY. POLICE DEP’T (Feb. 23, 2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6915-arberyshooting/b52fa09cdc974b970b79/optimized/full.pdf, with Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death
of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-shootinggeorgia.html [https://perma.cc/9TYN-VVE6].
130
Public Release Incident Report for G20-11303, GLYNN CTY. POLICE DEP’T (Feb. 23, 2020),
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6915-arbery-shooting/b52fa09cdc974b970b79/optimized/full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57QY-W946].
122
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and was worried that people could be in danger.131 The man claims that he saw the suspect entering
construction areas, acting suspiciously, and was then seen running through the neighborhood.132
The man says that he went with his son to make sure that no one was in trouble and brought their
legally owned shotgun and revolver with them for protection.133
The man saw the suspect, stopped, and got out of the truck to ask him if there was anything
wrong.134 The man says that the suspect immediately ran at him, attempted to attack him, and take
his gun from the man.135 The man claims to have made several attempts to push the suspect away
and fired one shot to try and stop the attack.136 The suspect continued to pursue him, and the man
fired another shot.137 At this point the suspect fell, the man searched him for weapons, and called
the police to report the attack.138 The police went to investigate, but after hearing the man’s claim
of self-defense, they took pictures of the scene and interviewed the men who saw the attack.139
The pictures show the trucks parked on the side of the road, three fired shotgun shells, and two
gunshot wounds on the victim’s chest.140 The victim did not have weapons, any items from the
construction site, and nothing was missing from the construction site.141 A neighbor said he saw
the victim fleeing the scene of a crime and saw the event, corroborating the man’s statements.142
The neighbor’s vehicle was also located at the scene.143
Was the victim the aggressor? Did the victim burglarize a home? Was the victim en route
to commit a forcible felony by breaking into another home? Did the man act in self-defense?
Without video evidence or other eyewitnesses, how could the man’s self-defense claim be refuted?
There were inconsistencies in the testimony, from the three shells to the language of the man’s
son, who said he was a [effing N-word].144 Did the men have probable cause to make a citizen’s
arrest for a breach of the peace?
In our hypothetical, the prosecutor would be unable to charge the men with murder without
probable cause, let alone bring a full criminal trial. If the prosecutor decides that there is probable
cause, and a grand jury returns an indictment, then the man will file a motion to dismiss under the
immunity statute. The man’s statement meets the prima facie case for a Stand Your Ground

131

Public Release Incident Report, supra note 129.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See generally Pilar Melendez, Travis McMichael Called Ahmaud Arbery the N-Word as He Lay Dying on the
Ground: Witness, DAILY BEAST (June 4, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/travis-mcmichael-called-ahmaudarbery-the-n-word-as-he-lay-dying-on-the-ground-witness-told-detective [https://perma.cc/PAU2-SLUJ]; see also
Minyvonne Burke, White Man Accused of Killing Ahmaud Arbery Allegedly Used Racial Slur After Shooting,
Investigator Says, NBC NEWS (June 4, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/white-man-accused-killingahmaud-arbery-allegedly-used-racial-slur-n1224696 [https://perma.cc/5NW8-TDVD]; Brakkton Booker, White
Defendant Allegedly Used Racial Slur After Killing Ahmaud Arbery, NPR (June 4, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/869938461/white-defendant-allegedly-used-racial-slur-after-killing-ahmaud-arbery
[https://perma.cc/EN6H-PA8J].
132

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2022

13

Barry Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

defense,145 the State cannot require the man to testify, and the other witnesses who were also there
with the man may raise their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This hypothetical
is almost identical to the situation that the Georgia Attorney General faced in the Ahmaud Arbery
shooting, except there is no video footage here.146 Video evidence tells a different story than the
hypothetical presented above147 and was integral in securing convictions of Travis McMichael,
Greggory McMichael, and William Bryan,148 but what would a prosecutor do without that video?
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND SOCIAL ISSUES WITH STAND YOUR GROUND

The Stand Your Ground law enforces a constitutional right—namely, the right to bear arms
in self-defense.149 Florida has consistently honored this right as central to both the United States
Constitution and the Florida Constitution.150 The right to self-defense in the protection of one’s
life is a basic human right.151 Our justice system is also designed to protect the rights of crime
victims.152 How do we protect these conflicting rights between defendants and victims while still
ensuring just proceedings?
There are other approaches to solve the immunity question without creating this dilemma
of placing the burden on the State to prove the negative in other states and in precedent case law.153
Studies regarding the defendants who have raised the Stand Your Ground defense at pretrial
hearings show that a significant number of defendants who have been acquitted do not fit the
paradigm of the innocent defender compelled by a deadly threat to use deadly force against
another.154 Both the media and the general public are under the misunderstanding that one may use
deadly force to stop any attack in any place where one has a right to be without grasping the
145

See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2017).
Fausset, supra note 129.
147
Id.
148
Hannah Knowles, Ahmaud Arbery’s Killers Sentenced to Life in Prison, Two with No Possibility of Parole, THE
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/01/07/ahmaud-arbery-murder-sentencing/
[https://perma.cc/U7BP-2XZT].
149
See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8(a) (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves . . . shall
not be infringed.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
150
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628; Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057 (Fla. 1999) (“[T]he right to fend off an
unprovoked and deadly attack is nothing less than the right to life itself . . . .”).
151
See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“It may be a reflection on human nature,
that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.”); see also CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 4–5 (1743) (explaining
“natural law”).
152
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b) (“‘[C]rime victims’ rights and interests are respected and protected by law in a manner
no less vigorous than protections afforded to criminal defendants . . . .”).
153
See generally Bunn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2008); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 971 (Colo. 1987).
154
See Susan Taylor Martin, Florida ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Yields Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How
Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/floridastand-your-ground-law-yields-some-shocking-outcomes-dependingon/1233133/#:~:text=Florida's%20%22stand%20your%20ground'',gang%20members%20to%20walk%20free.&text
=In%20the%20most%20comprehensive%20effort,''%20cases%20and%20their%20outcomes
[https://perma.cc/H2YJ-6LM4].
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concept of what “imminent use of deadly force” means or what is “objectively reasonable.”155
There is also widespread confusion about what the Stand Your Ground law is and how it applies
“among the legal actors charged with making decisions about whether to arrest, charge, and
adjudicate cases involving claims of self-defense.”156 There is an argument that immunity hearings
protect against the risk of unjust prosecution, but the current format also raises the risk that guilty
defendants will go free because of the dilemma of disproving the defendant’s motion to dismiss
when no evidence has been submitted by the defendant.157
In Simmons v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held when a defendant
must choose between two constitutional rights at a pretrial hearing, his testimony “may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.”158
The Simmons rule is normally used in Fourth Amendment motions to suppress159 but has also been
applied to double jeopardy hearings160 and in pretrial hearings to determine other immunities.161
Florida has taken a different view in pretrial immunity hearings and follows the general rule that
a defendant’s testimony at a prior proceeding is admissible against the defendant at trial, even if
the defendant declines to testify at the later trial.162
Currently, a defendant is not required to testify at the pretrial hearing,163 and defense
attorneys are wary about putting their client’s credibility at issue when their statements would be
admissible against them at trial in the State’s case-in-chief.164 The defendant’s statements would
be admissible because there is not a constitutionally protected right to file a motion for dismissal,
and a defendant making admissions in a motion to dismiss is not forced to choose between two
constitutional rights.165 In Cruz v. State, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals reasoned that
there was not a conflict between the Second and Fifth Amendments but was a question of whether
the defendant was actually exercising their Second Amendment right to self-defense.166 The dualedged sword, as it stands presently, puts the defendant at risk of his failed immunity claim from
the pretrial hearing being presented at trial and the costs and difficulty of having two trials put on
by the State without the ability to examine the defendant’s credibility if he chooses to not testify.
This dual-edged sword requires that both prosecutors and defense attorneys must treat this hearing
as an initial trial because the burden of proof falls on the State, and the possibility of a failed
immunity claim being admitted at trial would be a big nail in the coffin for a defendant’s selfdefense claim at the real trial.167
155

Elizabeth Elkin & Dakin Andone, What You Need to Know About ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws, CNN (July 29, 2018,
12:03
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/29/us/stand-your-ground-law-explainer-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/364X-9YAJ].
156
Id. (misstating the law that Stand Your Ground laws are no longer used as an affirmative defense).
157
Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that defendants choose to testify at the
pretrial hearing voluntarily).
158
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
159
Id.; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89 (1980).
160
United States v. Garcia, 721 F.2d 721, 723 (11th Cir. 1983).
161
See Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1387 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Had [the defendant] testified . . . in support of
his insanity defense or his incompetency claim, that testimony could not have been admitted at trial over his
objection.”).
162
See Cruz, 189 So. 3d at 828–29; see also State v. Billie, 881 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
163
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3, cl. 1.
164
Cruz, 189 So. 3d at 826, 829; see State v. Palmore, 510 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
165
Palmore, 510 So. 2d at 1154.
166
Cruz, 189 So. 3d at 829.
167
See id. (describing the pretrial hearing as another trial).
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A. Constitutional Issues with the Current Law
Scholars and practitioners have also questioned the constitutionality of the 2017
amendment.168 “Procedural law” is defined as the body of rules “which direct the course of [a]
proceeding to bring parties into the court and the course of the court after they are brought in.”169
The rules of procedure show the course of litigation in determining the outcome of a case.170
Procedural law is distinguished from the law of Evidence because Evidence law determines “what
testimony is to be admitted and what rejected in each case, and what is the weight to be given to
the testimony admitted.”171 The Florida Supreme Court has also held the view that “procedural
law concerns the means and methods to apply and enforce . . . duties and rights.”172
i. Separation of Powers
There are some who argue that the 2017 amendment violates the separation of powers
doctrine.173 Article V of the Florida Constitution created the judicial branch and the office of the
State Attorney and is thus a quasi-judicial officer.174 State Attorneys are also quasi-executive
officers and have exclusive authority to decide whether to prosecute a defendant.175 By requiring
a full trial of disproving the defendant’s case at the pretrial hearing—albeit at a lower burden of
proof—the legislature has removed the State’s right to a jury trial.176 This unilateral waiver of a
jury trial by a pretrial motion to dismiss encroaches on the executive and judicial branches’
authority.177 As the prosecuting officer in criminal cases, the Assistant State Attorney (“ASA”) is
both a quasi-judicial and quasi-executive officer, and the legislature’s invasion of the ASA’s
ability to accurately determine what happened when someone is killed violates Article II, § 3 of
the Florida Constitution.178
168

See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae League of Prosecutors-Florida in Support of Neither Party On the Issue of
the Constitutionality of § 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017) and in Support of the Respondent On the Issue of the
Retroactivity of § 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017), Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2019) (No. SC18-747),
2018 WL 5478954.
169
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 232 (1883) (defining procedure).
170
Id. (“[I]n defining practice . . . [t]he word means those legal rules which direct the course of proceeding to bring
parties into the court and the course of the court after they are brought in . . . .”).
171
Id.
172
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]ubstantive law prescribes duties and
rights and procedural law concerns the means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights.”).
173
Brief of Amicus Curiae League of Prosecutors-Florida in Support of Neither Party On the Issue of the
Constitutionality of § 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017) and in Support of the Respondent On the Issue of the
Retroactivity of § 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017) at 3, Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2019) (No. SC18-747),
2018 WL 5478954, at *3 (“The change in the burden of proof has the effect of allowing the defendant to determine
whether he or she wants an initial try by a judge or a jury.”).
174
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 17 (“In each judicial circuit a state attorney shall be elected to a term of four years.”).
175
Young v. State, 699 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. 1997) (“[T]he decision to prosecute a defendant . . . is a prosecutorial
function to be initiated at the prosecutor’s discretion and not by the court.”).
176
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.260 (“A defendant may in writing waive a jury trial with the consent of the state.”) (emphasis
added); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The [t]rial of all [c]rimes . . . shall be by jury.”).
177
See Off. of State Att’y v. Parrotino, 628 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1993) (“[T]he Legislature cannot take actions that
undermine the independence of Florida’s judicial and quasi-judicial offices.”).
178
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and
judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein.”).
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ii. Improper Delegation or Encroachment on Judicial Authority
There are two general violations of the Separation of Powers Doctrine: 1) no branch may
encroach upon the powers of another, and 2) no branch may delegate a constitutionally defined
power to another branch.179 All three branches are co-equal in authority and “the legislature cannot,
short of constitutional amendment, reallocate the balance of power expressly delineated in the
constitution among the three coequal branches.”180 On the other hand, an improper delegation
occurs when one branch delegates a power to another branch unless the delegation is 1) limited in
scope, 2) contains clear guidelines, and 3) does not transfer a core function of any branch, those
functions expressly stated in the Florida Constitution.181
Purely judicial acts are not subject The burden of proof clearly concerns the means and
methods by which the court makes an immunity determination and is considered procedural in
nature.182 More importantly, this change to the immunity statute contradicts the Florida
Constitution.183 Although the legislature may repeal any Supreme Court ruling by a two-thirds
vote, the legislature may not enact any laws relating to the practice and procedure of the courts
without the Florida Supreme Court’s approval.184 Therefore, there is a question whether the Florida
Legislature has encroached on the judicial branch’s authority to determine the procedure in
criminal cases.185
B. Stand Your Ground Statistics: A Social and Racial Epidemic
Any discussion on self-defense and Stand Your Ground laws must address, at least in
passing, the social and racial ramifications associated with the law and its application. It is
undisputed that the United States has a gun violence problem.186 Thirty-eight thousand eight
hundred twenty-six people die every year in the United States, or 11.7 deaths per 100,000
people.187 In Florida alone, 2,752 people die from guns every year.188 A report by Everytown For
Gun Safety found that gun deaths have increased by 10% annually from 2010 to 2019, or an extra

179

Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004).
Id. at 330.
181
Id. at 332-34.
182
See Fuller v. State, 257 So. 3d 521, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (“[T]he 2017 revision to the Stand Your Ground
law did not create any new right of self-defense or immunity from prosecution . . . .”).
183
In re Clarification of Fla. Rule of Prac. & Proc., 281 So. 2d 204, 204 (Fla. 1973).
184
Id. (“The legislature . . . has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure.”); see
State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1972) (explaining that an amendment to a rule of procedure is ineffective
unless the court breathes life into the legislative act).
185
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (“The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts . .
. .”).
186
See Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, Violent Death Rates in the US Compared to Those of the Other Highincome Countries, 2015, SCIENCEDIRECT (June 2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00917
43519300659 [https://perma.cc/4CEB-RQA8].
187
See Gun Violence in the United States, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Jan. 2021), https://everystat.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Gun-Violence-in-the-United-States-2.9.2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV4G-MTT5].
188
At a Glance Florida, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 12, 2022), https://www.everytown.org/state/florida/
[https://perma.cc/QLX6-WKUN].
180
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604 deaths every year.189 Gun violence also affects Floridian taxpayers, costing $8.8 billion on
gun homicides, assaults, and shootings by police each year, $418 per Floridian.190 Certain groups
are more at risk: children, teenagers, and people of color.191 Guns are the second-leading cause of
death among children and teenagers in Florida, with two-thirds of those being homicides.192 There
have been 90 school shootings in Florida since 1970, third in the country over that time span.193
The current state of gun laws in Florida does not provide greater protection for adults or children.
Just as tragic, black people are seven times more likely than white people to die by gun
homicide.194 This violent discrimination extends to police violence; black people are three times
more likely to be shot and killed by police.195 Studies have also shown that black people are
discriminated against in the legal system when attempting to raise Stand Your Ground defenses,
or at the very least are disproportionately affected.196 White defendants are 250% more likely to
be found justified in homicide prosecutions when the victim is a black person than a white person
is charged with homicide against another white person; in Stand Your Ground states, that number
jumps to 354%.197 Another study showed that 73% of defendants who were charged with homicide
with a black victim did not face any jail time compared to 59% that were charged with homicide
with a white victim.198 This study also found that Stand Your Ground claims were successful 34%
of the time when the shooter was a white person and the victim was a black person, compared to
3% when the shooter is a black person, and the victim is white.199 These numbers may be even
more skewed because the statistics cannot account for the situations where police, or ASAs, choose
not to pursue charges against someone claiming self-defense.200 The disparaging treatment has not
gone unnoticed: newspapers have commented on factually similar scenarios with two
distinctions—race and outcome.201 Despite these issues, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law
remains in effect, but what alternative can we take?
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SELF-DEFENSE
189

How Does Gun Violence Impact the Communities You Care About?, EVERYSTAT (Jan. 2022),
https://everystat.org/?_gl=1*xbxwoi*_ga*MTUyNTEzMjI2OC4xNjQxNzczNTg0*_ga_LT0FWV3EK3*MTY0MT
c3MzU5Mi4xLjEuMTY0MTc3NDA5Ni4w#Florida [https://perma.cc/XG2U-US4A].
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
School Shootings by State 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/staterankings/school-shootings-by-state [https://perma.cc/96ZT-8EUD] (last visited Mar. 14, 2022).
194
How Does Gun Violence Impact the Communities You Care About?, supra note 189 (emphasis added).
195
Gun Violence by Police, EVERYTOWN RSCH. & POL’Y (Feb. 21, 2022), https://everytownresearch.org/issue/gunviolence-by-police/?_ga=2.143531893.1552177280.1641774141-1525132268.1641773584 [https://perma.cc/XSY568PU].
196
Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in “Stand Your Ground” Laws?, PBS (July 31, 2012),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws/ [https://perma.cc/R5PGYRTD].
197
Id.
198
Sarah Iverson, Beyond ‘Stand Your Ground’: Florida's Other Racial Profiling Practices, AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 11,
2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2013/10/11/76860/beyond-stand-your-ground-floridasother-racial-profiling-practices/ [https://perma.cc/6SS4-CRQF].
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Susan Taylor Martin, Race Plays Complex Role in Florida's ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb.
17, 2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-plays-complex-role-in-floridas-stand-your-groundlaw/1233152 [https://perma.cc/XFF7-KZMZ] (discussing the effects of racial discrimination and the criminal justice
system).
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When looking at the dilemma that the State and defendants face-the constitutional, the
racial, and the social issues-is there a better way? If a change is to be made, how should Florida
proceed? Should we look to our sister states for guidance, or would we as a people be safer and
more secure in our rights by reverting back to the common law application of self-defense?
As a matter of policy, is it in the best interest of justice for one judge to determine both
matters of law and fact in deciding whether a defendant is completely immune to any prosecution
or civil suit? In today’s divided America, would it not be fairer to give both the defendant and the
State a choice of having a factfinder in these pretrial hearings? As of now, victims are unable to
have their voices heard at a trial of their peers during the pretrial hearing and will be unable to
bring civil suits against the defendant if the prosecution fails to meet their burden,202 and ASAs
that lack eyewitnesses will have difficulty proving that the defendant’s story is not true under the
current system. However, there are alternative options applied by other jurisdictions and in other
defenses.203
A. Option One: Adopting Georgia’s Immunity Procedure
One option is to consider adopting the procedure that Georgia currently applies. Georgia’s
self-defense statute is similar to Florida’s self-defense statute.204 Georgia has an immunity statute
that protects defendants from criminal prosecution but does not prevent civil lawsuits for wrongful
death.205 However, Georgia is distinguishable from Florida by not allowing a defendant to raise
the Stand Your Ground defense when the weapon is being illegally carried.206 Unlike Florida,
which allows defendants to use an “imminent” threat of death or great bodily harm to distinguish
situations where a defendant may stand their ground despite breaking the law,207 Georgia does not
make this distinction.208
Georgia also uses a pretrial hearing to determine whether a defendant is immune from
prosecution on the grounds of justifiable use of force.209 Georgia requires that a trial court
determine the matter of immunity in a pretrial hearing and cannot defer the issue to be determined
at trial.210 The Georgia Supreme Court reasons that “[a]s a potential bar to criminal proceedings
which must be determined prior to a trial, immunity represents a far greater right than any
202

FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2017).
See generally Bunn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2008); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987).
204
§ 16-3-21(a) (2022) (“[A] person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily
harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury . . . .”).
205
See id. § 16-3-24.2 (2022) (“A person who uses threats or force . . . shall be immune from criminal prosecution . .
. .”).
206
Id. (“[U]nless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is
unlawful by such person . . . .”).
207
Dooley v. State, 268 So. 3d 880, 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (holding in the Second District Court of Appeals
that “Section 776.012(1) provides another means of obtaining immunity under § 776.032 . . . .”); Fields v. State, 281
So. 3d 573, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that a defendant could receive a pretrial immunity hearing
despite being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in the Fifth District Court of Appeals); Hill v. State, 143 So.
3d 981, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (analyzing immunity individually under §§ 776.012, 776.013, and 776.031 in
the Fourth District Court of Appeals).
208
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (2022).
209
See State v. Hall, 793 S.E.2d 522, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
210
Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008) (“[W]hether a person is immune . . . must be determined by the trial
court as a matter of law before the trial of that person commences.”).
203
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encompassed by an affirmative defense, which may be asserted during trial but cannot stop a trial
altogether.”211 Georgia also looked to Florida in determining what burden should be applied.212
Finally, Georgia acknowledges that placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with
other defenses that would avoid trial altogether, such as insanity or incompetency.213 Like Florida,
Georgia also may pursue the affirmative defense at trial under the same statutory defenses that
grant immunity.214 Although not presently applied in immunity determinations, Georgia also
provides a solution to the issue of one judge determining questions of fact and law in incompetency
proceedings.215 In incompetency proceedings, either the state or the accused may demand a special
jury trial “to determine the accused’s competency to stand trial.”216 By adopting the Georgia
standard, Florida would place the burden of proof back on the defendant, consistent with other
defenses.217 However, adopting the Georgia solution would not answer all of the questions raised
by Justice Canady in his Bretherick dissent.
B. Option Two: Abolishing Stand Your Ground Immunity
There are also those that propose abolishing the Stand Your Ground law completely, taking
Florida back to the common law and pre-2005 jurisprudence.218 This stance argues that the Stand
Your Ground law makes communities more dangerous; increases gun violence; disproportionately
affects people of color on both sides of the aisle, those allegedly acting in self-defense and those
who become victims of alleged self-defense; and has created a new wild west—a world where
vigilantism takes the place of law and order.219 Representatives and activist groups, such as Moms
Demand Action, have continuously demanded self-defense reform every year since the George
Zimmerman trial in 2012, but they have not been considered by the legislature—the Self-Defense
Restoration Act has failed in multiple years without a single committee hearing.220

211

Bunn v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Ga. 2008).
Id. (looking at the burden of proof in Florida and Colorado).
213
See id.; Hester v. State, 659 S.E.2d 600, 603 (Ga. 2008) (explaining that a special jury determines if a defendant
has met their burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence); Foster v. State, 656 S.E.2d 838,
840 (Ga. 2008) (explaining that a defendant claiming insanity must prove their burden by a preponderance of the
evidence by a special jury prior to trial); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(2) (2022) (“A plea of guilty but mentally
ill at the time of the crime . . . shall not be accepted . . . until the court has examined the psychological or psychiatric
reports, held a hearing on the issue of the defendant’s mental condition, and is satisfied that there is a factual basis that
the defendant was mentally ill . . . .”).
214
Bunn, 667 S.E. at 608.
215
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130 (2022).
216
Id. (allowing a defendant to have a bench trial to determine competency unless the state or the accused demands a
special jury trial).
217
See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2017); see also Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 695 (Fla. 2015)
(explaining that a statute of limitation is a legislative bar against litigation); Hough v. Menses, 95 So. 2d 410, 412
(Fla. 1957).
218
Greg Allen, Florida Lawmakers Debate to Repeal Infamous Stand Your Ground Law, NPR (Feb. 4, 2021 4:30
PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/04/964172326/florida-lawmakers-debate-to-repeal-infamous-stand-your-groundlaw [https://perma.cc/3WPL-JSQD].
219
Id.
220
See S.B. 1052, 123d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); see also Christine Stapleton, Gun Bill Seeks to Repeal
Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law . . . Again, THE PALM BEACH POST (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/2021/02/05/gun-bill-seeks-repeal-floridas-stand-your-ground-lawagain/4385722001/ [https://perma.cc/62WF-XJXE].
212
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Senator Shevrin Jones (“Senator Jones”), of West Park, has been at the forefront of this
movement.221 Senator Jones proposes the abolition of Stand Your Ground immunity under §
776.032 and the right to use deadly force in any situation where one “has a right to be.” Instead,
Senator Jones proposes that Florida revert to the common law, breathing life into the duty to retreat
to the wall.222 Senate Bill 888 proposes that “a person may not use deadly force . . . if the person
knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using deadly force with complete safety by
retreating.”223 In addition, Senator Jones’ proposal would leave the expanded home-protection
statute intact and would protect the right to possess concealed firearms or other weapons for selfdefense in accordance with § 790.25(5).224 However, if the past decade has been any indication,
this movement faces a steep hill to climb, and this article proposes a solution that is more likely to
please both sides of the political spectrum, ASAs and defense attorneys, and increase judicial
efficiency.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A BETTER SOLUTION
The immunity statute creates a unique procedure for determining the question of justified
self-defense, distinct from other defenses that defendants raise in criminal trials. The immunity
provided under the Florida law is not true immunity in the ordinary sense of the word because a
judge determines whether the defendant is justified in using self-defense under the particular
circumstances based on a statutory creation.225 The immunity to avoid trial rests on the affirmative
defense of justifiable self-defense.226 The self-defense claim in immunity proceedings does not
operate like other defenses, and my proposal seeks to bring a balance between both the majority
and minority’s concerns. My proposal is to create a procedure like those used in motions to
suppress evidence unlawfully obtained under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to a warrantless
search.227
A. The Procedure Under a Motion to Suppress Evidence
The right to use self-defense to prevent death is a personal right, just as the right to prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right.228 The founders believed that the Bill of
221

S.B. 888, 123d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Amended Brief of the University of Miami School of Law Federal Appellate Clinic in Support of Neither Party on
the Issue of the Constitutionality of Florida Statutes s 776.032 at 12, Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2019) (No.
SC18-747), 2018 WL 5825371 at *12 (“A person with true immunity is privileged to violate the law by virtue of her
office, position, or status totally independent of the facts of the case.”).
226
FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2022) (“A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013,
or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or
threatened use of such force . . . .”).
227
The burden of proof differs depending on whether a search was made pursuant to a warrant or not. See Kentucky
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. . . .”); State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“When a search warrant has
[been] issued, the defense has the burden of going forward, and the burden to establish grounds for suppression. In
the absence of a warrant, however, the defense need only make an initial showing at the suppression hearing.”).
228
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 389, 389 (1968) (explaining that “rights assured by the Fourth Amendment
are personal rights”).
222
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Rights in the Constitution list some, but not all, of the personal rights of private citizens.229
Therefore, proceedings that seek to protect these rights, whether by statutory enactment or under
the Constitution, should be resolved in a similar manner to ensure uniformity and provide for the
best procedure to uphold the spirit of the law. To decide how this procedure should be applied in
an immunity proceeding under Stand Your Ground, we should first look to the procedure used in
motions to suppress evidence seized during an invalid search.
i. Sufficiency of the Motion
A defendant that wishes to suppress evidence obtained during an unlawful search and
seizure must move to suppress the evidence, and the motion must “state clearly the particular
evidence sought to be suppressed, the reasons for suppression, and a general statement of the facts
on which the motion is based.”230 Before hearing any evidence on the matter, the judge determines
the legal sufficiency of the motion before the defendant can submit evidence to support
suppression.231 If the motion to suppress is legally sufficient, a hearing is required232 and denial of
a legally sufficient motion without a hearing is reversible error as a denial of procedural due
process.233
ii. The Suppression Hearing
By filing the motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden of making an initial showing
that the search was invalid.234 However, unlike in the pretrial immunity hearing, a defendant cannot
simply rely on the four corners of the motion.235 The defendant must first present evidence at the
suppression hearing to both ownership of the contraband seized and the illegality of the search.236

229

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that a bill of rights expressly states some of the immunities
provided for citizens).
230
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(g)(2).
231
Id. R. (g)(3).
232
See., e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (“[W]e hold that, where the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the
finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”);
Lambert v. State, 626 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning in the Fourth District Court of Appeals
that “[t]he law is now settled that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, subsequent to the Ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual
statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant.”); Mason v. State, 375 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (First District Court of Appeals); T.C. v. State, 336 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (Third
District Court of Appeals).
233
See Gadson v. State, 600 So. 2d 1287, 1288–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (determining that reviewing the motion
and opposing memoranda is insufficient to satisfy the hearing requirement); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(h)(3).
234
See Miles v. State, 953 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“The initial burden requires the defense to make
some showing that a search occurred and was invalid.”).
235
Id.
236
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1978) (explaining that the defendant must testify to ownership of the
items seized at the pretrial hearing); see also Williams v. State, 640 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The
bare allegations set forth in the motion, unsupported by proof, are insufficient to sustain [the defendant’s] initial
burden.”).
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Second, the burden of proof starts with the defendant and then shifts to the State after the
defendant makes an initial showing that the search was invalid.237 The adult238 defendant must
prove the prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.239 Once the defendant makes the
initial showing, the burden then shifts to the State to prove by a preponderance that the search was
not illegal.240
iii. Hearsay in Suppression Hearings
In determining what evidence can be admitted at the pretrial hearing, the court is not
automatically barred from receiving hearsay evidence.241 Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Florida does not have a provision allowing a trial judge to recognize additional exceptions to the
hearsay rule when there are sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability.242 Rather, hearsay is
admissible to determine whether the defendant consented to a search,243 statements relied upon in
establishing probable cause for a search warrant by informants,244 or statements made by a dispatch
officer to establish that the police officer acted with reasonable suspicion or probable cause.245
These statements are excluded from the ban on hearsay as verbal acts, or words that have
independent legal significance, rather than being used for the truth of the matter asserted.246 The
rule against hearsay is relaxed in these situations because the “reasonable cause necessary to
support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial,
237

State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (“Two aspects of the rule would require, first of all,
a pleading sufficient within itself to allege an unlawful search, and secondly, at the hearing, a [p]rima facie showing
of invalidity.”).
238
The State must prove their burden by clear and convincing evidence when a minor is involved. See Saavedra v.
State, 622 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 1993) (“[T]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence from the totality of
the circumstances that the minor gave free and voluntary consent.”).
239
Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 1980) (“Under ordinary circumstances the . . . search must be
established by preponderance of the evidence.”).
240
See Miles, 953 So. 2d at 779 (“When that prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the state to prove that
the search is valid.”); U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (explaining that the State must meet its burden by a
preponderance of the evidence).
241
See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 175; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (creating a direct linkage to the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court); but see Parker v. State, 89 So. 3d 844,
859 (Fla. 2012) (finding that the hearsay was not admissible because “the evidence concern[ed] whether [the
defendant], after having invoked his right to counsel on May 5, initiated contact with law enforcement on May 7.”);
State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704, 709 (Fla. 2012) (holding that the fellow officer rule is not an exception to the hearsay
rule because “another ‘unknowing’ officer cannot rely on the fellow officer rule simply because the officer finds out
relevant information possessed by another officer ‘after the fact’” (quoting State v. Peterson, 739 So. 2d 561, 568 (Fla.
1999))).
242
FED. R. EVID. 708.
243
Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing hearsay despite the inability to crossexamine the declarant).
244
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960) (“If an officer may act upon probable cause without a
warrant when the only incriminating evidence in his possession is hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold that such
evidence presented in an affidavit is insufficient basis for a warrant.”).
245
Taylor v. State, 845 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that hearsay evidence is admissible despit
playing no role in establishing the elements of the offense at trial)
246
See State v. Welker, 536 So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1988); see also Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Alaqua
Property, 190 So. 3d 662, 664-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (ruling that promissory notes are not hearsay for its
independent legal significance); A.J. v. State, 677 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“Words of a contract,
often characterized as verbal acts, are non hearsay because they have independent legal significance–the law
attached duties and liability to their utterance.”).
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unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibl[y] perform their
duties.”247 As the trier of fact and law, the trial judge must weigh and determine the credibility of
all the evidence, including the testimony of police officers.248
iv. Implication of a Failed Motion to Suppress
If the judge does not grant the suppression of evidence, the defendant’s testimony is not
automatically admissible against him at trial.249 Although the State may not use the defendant’s
testimony to prove his guilt, the State may use this evidence for impeachment purposes.
Proponents for admitting the testimony argue that “the testimony was voluntarily given and
relevant” and should be admissible like any other prior testimony or admission.250 However,
allowing the evidence automatically at trial creates a compulsion to testify to prevent giving up
the benefit of potential exclusion.251 The Simmons Court found that this coercion conflicted with
two constitutional rights, the Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and it is “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another.”252 The exception for admitting testimony is made to prevent the
defendant from changing his story at trial.253
v. Appealing a Denied Motion to Suppress
On review, the courts must apply a dual standard in reviewing a motion to suppress.254 The
appellate court must resolve the legal question under de novo review, “while factual decisions by
the trial court are entitled to deference commensurate with the trial judge’s superior vantage point
for resolving factual disputes.255 A trial judge’s determination is presumed correct, and the district
courts must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to
sustaining the lower court’s decision.256 This standard of review is the same under the current
Stand Your Ground procedure257 and would remain the same under my proposal.
B. Option Three: A Better Solution
247

United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d. Cir. 1945) (quoting Justice Learned Hands reasoning for
relaxing the rule against hearsay).
248
Lewis v. State, 979 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
249
See Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 394, 394 (1968) (“[W]hen a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue
of guilt unless he makes no objection.”).
250
Id. at 390 (testimony is not admissible on the question of guilt).
251
Id. at 393–94.
252
Id. at 394.
253
U.S. v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974) (“The protective shield of Simmons is not to be converted into a license
for false representations . . . .”).
254
See State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
255
Id. at 344–45.
256
Holden v. State, 877 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“A ruling on a motion to suppress is
presumptively correct, and a reviewing court should interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions
drawn from the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court ruling.”); Pagan v. State, 830 So.
2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) (requiring competent, substantial evidence).
257
Derossett v. State, No. 5D19-0802, 2019 WL 5848991, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2019) (“Our standard of
review of a trial court’s denial of a pretrial motion claiming immunity under the Stand Your Ground statutes is the
same as that which is applied to the denial of a motion to suppress.”).
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The court should apply a shifting standard at the pretrial immunity hearing involving a
Stand Your Ground defense. The defendant would have the initial burden of proving that he acted
in self-defense and could not rely on the four corners of the motion to dismiss. Instead, the
defendant must present some evidence, whether by testimony, video, photograph, or otherwise,
that shows that 1) he or she was in a place where he had a right to be, and 2) he or she was in
reasonable fear of death or bodily harm before using deadly force. The defendant must meet this
initial burden by a preponderance of the evidence, and then the burden would shift to the State to
disprove the defendant’s story.
The State would also have to disprove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The
State may do so by cross-examining the defendant’s witnesses or introducing their own evidence
to show that either the defendant was the aggressor or otherwise did not act out of a justifiable fear
of death or great bodily harm. The judge may allow hearsay evidence where, under the totality of
the circumstances, there is reason to believe that the out-of-court statements are credible and
relevant to the issue of justified self-defense as verbal acts and statements showing the effect on
the listener-victim. The judge would weigh all the evidence under the totality of the circumstances
in deciding whether the defendant used justifiable deadly force before granting or denying the
motion to dismiss.
If the defendant’s immunity claim fails, he or she may still raise the affirmative defense at
trial, and the pretrial evidence may not be admitted on the issue of guilt. However, the defendant
may not change his story at trial, and the State may use the evidence presented at the pretrial
hearing to impeach the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses at trial. The new dual-edged sword
would still require the defense attorney to “show their hand” by requiring the defendant to maintain
their story at both the pretrial hearing and at trial, while the State would still have the ultimate
burden of disproving the defendant’s story at the pretrial hearing. As Larry David once “quoted”258
the great compromiser, Henry Clay: “A good compromise is when both parties are dissatisfied . .
. .”259 Unlike the common compromise myth, this solution would place the immunity burden where
it should be, on the defendant, and allows them to tell their story without fear of a failed claim
being used against them as substantive evidence at trial, and the prosecution benefits from the
shifting burden, rather than fights blanket statements in a motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
My proposal attempts to resolve both the majority and minority’s concerns in Bretherick.
Although Justice Canady had a fear that some defendants who would ultimately be acquitted would
not be able to enjoy immunity from trial, this fear is one that is consistent with all innocent
defendants who are acquitted. We do not have a crystal ball to tell us what happened, and we must
create a system that provides justice for both victims and justified defendants. By requiring the
defendant to make an initial showing at the pretrial hearing, the defendant does not gain a
presumption of blanket immunity for the State to disprove and must provide some evidence for
the State to refute. The shifting burden would not require the State to have the sole burden on
disproving an affirmative defense and is consistent with other motions to dismiss.

258
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Further, the State would not have to meet the same burden twice and would be placed on
an even field with the defendant on the issue of immunity by requiring the same burden of proof
on both sides. By allowing the State to impeach a defendant at trial based on his pretrial testimony,
the court would limit meritless claims because defense attorneys would need to think twice before
revealing their hand before trial when alleging what happened. Allowing the State to impeach the
defendant and his or her witnesses will prevent fraud by keeping the defendant honest throughout
the proceedings, and a lower burden of proof will help alleviate the potential for two full-blown
trials. We do not want vigilante justice, but we must protect those who use deadly force to protect
themselves and others. The right to use self-defense is not inherently bad, but when it becomes
impracticable to distinguish murder from justice, the law has gone too far. As Martin Luther King
Jr. once said, “[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail
in this purpose, they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social
progress.”260
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